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CIVIL RIGHTS NOTES: AMERICAN INDIANS
AND BANISHMENT, JURY TRIALS, AND THE
DOCTRINE OF LENITY
Grant Christensen*
If we fight for civil liberties for our side, we show that we believe
not in civil liberties but in our side. But when those of us who never
were Indians and never expect to be Indians fight for the cause of
Indian self-government, we are fighting for something that is not
limited by the accidents of race and creed and birth; we are fighting
for . . . the integrity or salvation of our own souls.
—Felix S. Cohen1
INTRODUCTION
Felix Cohen is widely accepted as the father of modern Indian law.2 In perhaps
his most oft-quoted observation, he compared the country’s treatment of American
Indians to the miner’s canary, noting that how our society treats Indians is an ultimate
reflection on our own values, and a warning of the potential decay in civil society:
“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in
our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment
of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”3
Consider the core democratic ideals embodied by citizenship and voting rights.
While the U.S. Constitution initially treated “all other persons” (i.e., slaves) as three-
fifths of a person for purposes of the appropriation of seats in Congress, Indians
* Grant Christensen is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota
where he is also the director of the University’s Indian Law Certificate Program, and an Asso-
ciate Justice on the Standing Rock Sioux Supreme Court. He holds an LL.M. in Indigenous
Peoples Law & Policy from the University of Arizona and a JD from Ohio State University.
The author is indebted to the University of North Dakota and the Webb family for the support
of the Webb Professorship Award during the 2017–18 school year, which provided as-
sistance for the completion of this piece. I want to extend thanks specifically to colleagues
Melissa Tatum, Jim Grijalva, Anne Mullins, and Mike Hanson whose support and advice
have been invaluable.
1 Felix S. Cohen, Indian Self Government, in RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS’ FIGHT
FOR FREEDOM 74 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Joane Nagel & Troy Johnson 2d eds., 1999).
2 Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 357
(2008); see Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism
in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (2006) (discussing the seminal im-
portance of Felix Cohen and his Handbook of Federal Indian Law).
3 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
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were not treated as people at all.4 After the Civil War, when Congress amended the
Constitution to eliminate the three-fifths provision, it explicitly chose to keep the
language “excluding Indians not taxed,”5 and thereby reaffirmed Indians’ constitu-
tionally inferior status.6 While the Fourteenth Amendment purported to extend citizen-
ship to “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States,”7 and the Fifteenth
Amendment granted all “citizens of the United States” the right to vote,8 both provi-
sions excluded Indians from their respective definitions of “person” and “citizen.”
In Elk v. Wilkins,9 the United States Supreme Court affirmed these exclusions,
reasoning that Indians born in the United States are loyal first to their tribe and not
the federal government, and therefore are not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” as
required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright-citizenship clause.10 Because
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”) (emphasis added).
5 Id. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed.”) (emphasis added).
6 The floor debates on the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment made clear that, although
Congress was willing to reverse the three-fifths compromise, it felt that Indians should still
expressly be excluded from legal personhood. Consider Wisconsin Senator Doolittle’s statement:
“[T]here is a large mass of the Indian population who are clearly subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States who ought not to be included as citizens of the United States . . . . [T]he word
‘citizen,’ if applied to them, would bring in all the Digger Indians of California.” CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2892 (1866). Also consider Michigan Senator Howard’s statement:
I am not yet prepared to pass a sweeping act of naturalization by which all the
Indian savages, wild or tame, belonging to a tribal relation, are to become my
fellow-citizens and go to the polls and vote with me and hold lands and deal in
every other way that a citizen of the United States has a right to do.
Id. at 2895. Finally, note Oregon Senator Williams’s statement: “I would not agree to this
proposed constitutional amendment if I supposed it made Indians not taxed citizens of the
United States.” Id. at 2897.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.”).
8 Id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”).
9 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
10 Id. at 99–102 (“Under the Constitution of the United States, as originally established,
‘Indians not taxed’ were excluded from the persons according to whose numbers representa-
tives and direct taxes were apportioned among the several States . . . . The members of those
tribes owed immediate allegiance to their several tribes, and were not part of the people of
the United States . . . . Indians . . . although in a geographical sense born in the United States,
are no more ‘born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ within the
meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of
any foreign government . . . .”).
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Indians are not born citizens, the Court continued, the Fifteenth Amendment does
not extend to them the right of the ballot.11 Essentially, despite being the original
inhabitants of the land with ancestry dating back thousands of years, American Indians
uniquely were not entitled to birthright citizenship.12 It was not until 1924 that all
Indians finally became citizens, and even then the change was reflected by an Act of
Congress instead of a reinterpretation of the Constitution’s definition of personhood.13
Fortunately, the civil rights movement promoted advances in the protection and
enforcement of rights of American Indians along with other disenfranchised groups
at all levels of government.14 For example, Lawrence Baca, long-time chair of the
Federal Bar Association’s Indian Law Section, has commented powerfully on the
effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
When I was a child growing up in Southern California, I remember
seeing signs in the outlying parts of San Diego County saying
“No Indians Allowed” or “No Indians Served.” Title II, forbidding
discrimination in places of public accommodation, struck down
the efficacy of those signs. Under the anti-discrimination provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act, Indians are a race, and the signs
could no longer stand.15
11 Id. at 109 (“The plaintiff, not being a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, has been deprived of no right secured by the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, and cannot maintain this action.”).
12 Id. at 103 (“[T]he language used, about the same time, by the very Congress which
framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9,
1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, is ‘all persons born in the United
States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.’ Such Indians,
then, not being citizens by birth, can only become citizens in the second way mentioned in
the Fourteenth Amendment, by being ‘naturalized in the United States,’ by or under some
treaty or statute.” (citation omitted)).
13 Indian Citizenship Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b), 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (repealed 1972) (“That
all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are
hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, That the granting of such
citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal
or other property.”). For a critical discussion of the process by which Indians became citizens,
see Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:
Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples,
15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 (1999); Stacy L. Leeds & Erin S. Shirl, Whose Sovereignty?
Tribal Citizenship, Federal Indian Law, and Globalization, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 89 (2014);
Mark Shawhan, “By Virtue of Being Born Here”: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2012).
14 In an early case on Indian rights at the beginning of the civil rights era, the Supreme
Court established the now foundational principle of Indian law that, “[e]ssentially, absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
15 Lawrence R. Baca, American Indians, the Racial Surprise in the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
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However, Chairman Baca also observed that the Civil Rights Act in other provisions
explicitly excludes its application to Indian tribes and businesses, permitting them
to discriminate in favor of Indians.16 The Supreme Court has upheld similar provi-
sions related to hiring and promotion preferences for Indians by divisions of the
federal government that work primarily with tribes.17
Not only does federal law contain such exemptions, but the Constitution and its
attendant Bill of Rights also do not apply to tribal governments when acting on persons
on tribal lands.18 Chief Justice Roberts, in his first Indian-law opinion, remarked,
“Tribal sovereignty, it should be remembered, is ‘a sovereignty outside the basic struc-
ture of the Constitution.’ The Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes.”19 Fifty
years ago, to ensure that the civil rights of Indian persons were upheld by their respec-
tive tribal governments,20 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).21
This Article examines the application of ICRA on the fiftieth anniversary of its
adoption. In preparation for this piece, and to try to evaluate the successes of the Act
They May, More Correctly, Perhaps, Be Denominated a Political Group, 48 HOW. L.J. 971,
974 (2005).
16 Id. at 972–73 (“In the middle of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Title VII, which forbids
discrimination in employment, states: . . . ‘Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply
to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly
announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential
treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.’
Are you surprised by this provision? Most readers are.”).
17 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974) (upholding the Indian Reorga-
nization Act’s hiring and promotion practices for Indians over non-Indians at the Bureau of
Indian Affairs on the basis that “this preference does not constitute ‘racial discrimination.’
Indeed, it is not even a ‘racial’ preference. Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably de-
signed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive
to the needs of its constituent groups”).
18 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
19 Id. (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
20 For a discussion of the origins and motivations behind ICRA, see Angela R. Riley, (Tribal)
Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 809 (2007) (“The American civil rights
movement of the 1960s inspired reformers to transform tribal governments. Senator Sam
Ervin of North Carolina led this endeavor, introducing bills in Congress designed to extend
constitutional protections to individual Indians via an Indian Bill of Rights. Ervin’s aide, a
Lumbee Indian, was partially responsible for inspiring Ervin’s work on the bill. . . . When
Ervin learned that the U.S. Bill of Rights did not apply to individual Indians subject to the
control of tribal governments, he commented that such a notion was ‘alien to popular concepts
of American jurisprudence.’ Ervin thus sought to ensure that tribal governments offered
protections to individual Indians similar to those enjoyed by citizens living under federal,
state, and local governments.” (citations omitted)).
21 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, 82 Stat. 73 (1968). For a dis-
cussion of the limits of ICRA, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and Fundamental
Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 59, 94 (2013) (“ICRA,
merely a federal statute, does not carry the same weight as the United States Constitution
and, therefore, provides insufficient protection for nonmembers in tribal court.”).
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fifty years later, I have read every ICRA case decided by federal courts in 2017. The
final verdict is mixed. Despite fifty years of jurisprudence, new federal circuit splits
have emerged on the application of ICRA and the availability of its only remedy,
habeas corpus. The intent of this piece is to provide a snapshot of ICRA fifty years on,
and to continue to tell the stories of those persons at the center of its controversies.
Part I of this Article provides a short overview of ICRA and its evolution over the
last fifty years. Included in this section is a discussion of the seminal Supreme Court
case on ICRA, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,22 in which the Court held that
although the tribe’s membership provision discriminated against women on the basis
of gender, there was no federal remedy available to enforce ICRA’s guarantee of
equal protection.23
Part II discusses the use of ICRA by courts in 2017. It breaks down its observa-
tions into three categories to better tell the stories of the persons and rights at the
center of ICRA litigation: the right to a jury trial, the availability of a writ of habeas
corpus, and the effect of uncounseled convictions in tribal courts. This section gives
specific attention to the tension between different courts and the development of a
new circuit split that will eventually require redress. Each of the three themes is
explored through an observation of relevant case material from 2017 followed by
a short commentary on how the cases inform the availability of civil rights for Indian
defendants in front of tribal courts.
The last section provides some concluding observations which attempt to
suggest a way forward, both to resolve some of the conflicting circuit authority and
to continue to protect the rights of individuals from the exigencies of tribal govern-
ments. In this final section, ICRA is both praised and criticized. Even fifty years on
there is substantial work to do to secure even the basic rights of Indian defendants
in some tribal courts.
I. BASICS OF THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
It has long been established that, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote so explicitly in
Plains Commerce, the Constitution does not apply to Indian tribes.24 As early as
22 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
23 Id. at 56, 59 (“As separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically
been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limi-
tations on federal or state authority. . . . Even in matters involving commercial and domestic
relations, we have recognized that ‘subject[ing] a dispute arising on the reservation among
reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for themselves,’ may
‘undermine the authority of the tribal cour[t] . . . and hence . . . infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves.’” (quoting first Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387–88
(1976), and then quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959))).
24 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
Chief Justice Roberts relies on Supreme Court precedent that dates back to the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
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1896, the Court held that the Cherokee Nation’s tribal court was not required to
empanel a grand jury when bringing murder charges against a tribal member in
tribal court, because the Constitution’s reach does not extend to Indian tribes when
they exercise their inherent local powers of self-government.25 Although tribes are
subject to the plenary power of Congress, they are not bound by the Constitution
when exercising these local powers.26
In 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act was passed by Congress to ensure that
individuals appearing before tribal tribunals had the protection of most, but not all,
of the Constitution’s individual rights.27 Accordingly, ICRA expressly acts upon the
inherent local powers of tribes (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall . . .”)28 and extends protections to individuals by placing limits on
tribal tribunals.29 Notably absent from these protections is any right to counsel, at
least when the accused cannot be imprisoned for more than one year.30 Other rights
are exercised differently. For example, the right to a jury trial involving at least six
members must be requested by the defendant.31
Since ICRA’s enactment in 1968 there has been no shortage of excellent com-
mentary about the differences between the rights protected by the Constitution and
25 Talton, 163 U.S. at 384 (“It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed
by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth
Amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object to control the powers conferred
by the Constitution on the National Government. The fact that the Indian tribes are subject
to the dominant authority of Congress, and that their powers of local self government are also
operated upon and restrained by the general provisions of the Constitution of the United
States, completely answers the argument of inconvenience which was pressed in the dis-
cussion at bar.”).
26 Id. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 313–14 (1978) (finding that the
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution does not prevent an individual from being tried
by both the United States and an Indian tribe for the same offense).
27 See Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
889, 899 (2003).Important exceptions include:
the guarantee of a republican form of government, the prohibition against an
established religion, the requirement of free counsel for an indigent accused, the
right to a jury trial in civil cases, the provisions broadening the right to vote, and
the prohibitions against denial of the privileges and immunities of citizens.
Id. at 899 n.60.
28 Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, 82 Stat. 73.
29 Id. § 1302(c).
30 Id. See also United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958–59 (2016) (holding that de-
fendant’s tribal court convictions complied with ICRA and thus, defendant’s lack of counsel
was not unconstitutional).
31 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . .”), with Indian Civil Rights Act § 1302(a) (“No Indian tribe
in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense pun-
ishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.”).
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those protected by ICRA.32 Much of this scholarship points to the seminal impor-
tance of the first Supreme Court case which squarely addressed the rights and
remedies provided by ICRA: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.33
In Santa Clara, the Supreme Court concluded that the rights conferred by ICRA
are enforceable only through a writ of habeas corpus, and therefore that it is possible
that ICRA may grant rights that, even when violated, are unprotectable by federal
courts.34 The facts of Santa Clara read like a textbook example of discrimination on
the basis of gender. Julia Martinez was a full-blooded member of the Santa Clara
Pueblo who had married and had children with a Navajo man.35 The Pueblo had an
ordinance that granted membership to the offspring of male members with female
non-members, but denied membership to the offspring of female members whose
partners were non-members.36 Ms. Martinez and her children brought suit against
the tribe alleging that the membership ordinance violated ICRA’s equal-protection
guarantee because it discriminated on the basis of sex and ancestry.37 The Supreme
Court recognized the violation of equal protection, but affirmed the district court’s
determination that the balance between enforcing the equal protection of the laws
and deferring to tribal cultural practices should ordinarily be made by the tribe itself
and not by the federal court.38 The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the
32 See, e.g., Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of a Crime: A
Trial and Congressional Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317 (2013); Fletcher, supra note
21; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIB. 45 (2012);
Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act,
68 N.D. L. REV. 657 (1992); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and
the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989); Katherine Robillard, Uncounseled Tribal
Court Convictions: The Sixth Amendment, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 2047; Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-
Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 479 (2000).
33 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
34 Id. at 61 (“Not only are we unpersuaded that a judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal
sovereignty is required to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA, but to the contrary, the structure
of the statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Congress’[s] failure
to provide remedies other than habeas corpus was a deliberate one.”).
35 Id. at 52.
36 Id. at 51 (“Respondents, a female member of the tribe and her daughter, brought suit in
federal court against the tribe and its Governor, petitioner Lucario Padilla, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against enforcement of a tribal ordinance denying membership in the tribe
to children of female members who marry outside the tribe, while extending membership to
children of male members who marry outside the tribe.”).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 54 (“[T]he District Court concluded that the balance to be struck between these
competing interests was better left to the judgment of the Pueblo: ‘[T]he equal protection
guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should not be construed in a manner which would
require or authorize this Court to determine which traditional values will promote cultural
survival and should therefore be preserved . . . . Such a determination should be made by the
people of Santa Clara; not only because they can best decide what values are important, but
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Constitution does not apply to tribal courts when they exercise their inherent authority,
only the tribe itself or Congress could provide injured parties with a remedy.39 When
it enacted ICRA, the only enforcement provision Congress chose to include was a
petition for habeas corpus.40 The Court held that, unless Congress expressly provides
an additional remedy, tribes and their institutions, including tribal courts, have the
exclusive right to resolve intra-tribal disputes.41 Because neither Ms. Martinez nor
her daughter was physically detained, federal courts were without subject-matter
jurisdiction to issue an order to enforce their statutory right to equal protection.42
In addition to the limited habeas remedy, ICRA also limited the criminal
punishments that tribes could levy.43 Originally ICRA limited tribal penalties to no
more than six months’ imprisonment and a fine of no more than $500 per offense.44
In 1986, these limits were raised to one year in prison and no more than $5,000 per
offense.45 In 2010, the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA) amended ICRA again,
permitting tribes to impose a fine of up to $15,000, and raising the prison term to up
to three years per offense and nine years per total criminal proceeding.46 However,
TLOA required the tribe to provide counsel for a defendant at least equal to one
which would be guaranteed by the Constitution, and to comply with several notice
and reporting requirements before it could impose the heightened penalties.47
The criminal procedures followed by Indian tribunals are accordingly different
from the procedures followed in other courts in the United States. On the one hand,
also because they must live with the decision every day. . . . To abrogate tribal decisions, part-
icularly in the delicate area of membership, for whatever “good” reasons, is to destroy cultural
identity under the guise of saving it.’” (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp.
5, 18–19 (D.N.M. 1975))).
39 Id. at 58 (“In 25 U.S.C. § 1303, the only remedial provision expressly supplied by Con-
gress, the ‘privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’ is made ‘available to any person, in a court
of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.’”).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 65–66 (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for
the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of
both Indians and non-Indians. . . . Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to disturb the
balance between the dual statutory objectives which Congress apparently struck in providing
only for habeas corpus relief.”).
42 Id. at 72 (“[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a federal forum would
represent, we are constrained to find that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.”).
43 See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b)–(d), 82 Stat. 73.
44 Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C.
L. REV. 779, 822 (2006).
45 Id. at 822 n.243.
46 Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b), 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
47 Id. § 1302(c)(1)–(5). Recall that unlike the right to counsel provided by the Sixth
Amendment, tribes are not ordinarily required to provide a defendant with counsel unless the
defendant will be incarcerated for more than one year.
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they are less constrained. The constitutional aspects of criminal procedure do not
apply to tribal forums as a matter of law.48 Even when a right has been extended by
Congress, as a practical matter, tribes are only required to provide defendants with
those rights if the defendant faces incarceration; otherwise, even if an individual is
denied a right explicitly articulated by ICRA, federal courts are without subject-
matter jurisdiction to afford the individual claiming the violation with any relief.49
However, on the other hand, Congress has constrained the power of Indian tribunals
well beyond the limits placed on state or federal courts.50 The penalty that may be
imposed is so limited that even the most egregious crimes, like rape or murder, carry
a penalty of no more than three years per offense and nine years per proceeding.51
This combination of limited punishment and lax procedure was designed to give
deference to tribes to create their own justice systems that could be responsive to the
limited resources of tribal governments and accommodative of tribal custom and
tradition.52 In this vein, there is a gap between the procedures followed by tribal
courts and those that would otherwise be available in other American forums. This
gap has precipitated problems that, even fifty years after ICRA’s enactment, are still
regularly heard by federal courts through petitions for habeas corpus under ICRA.
II. EVENTS IN 2017
Although the Indian Civil Rights Act has had binding effect on tribal courts for
fifty years, the sheer amount of ongoing litigation surrounding ICRA, and the notable
success of many petitioners, suggest that tribal-court processes are in need of contin-
ued improvement to ensure that all defendants’ rights are protected. In preparation
for evaluating the merits of ICRA’s implementation in its fiftieth year,53 I have read
every case that cited to it and that was issued by a federal court in 2017.54 Not all of
these cases deserve mention, and several of them are obscure.55 After reading through
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. § 1302(b).
51 See id. § 1302(a)(7)(C)–(D).
52 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66–67 (1978) (“Congress’[s] provision for
habeas corpus relief, and nothing more, reflected a considered accommodation of the competing
goals of ‘preventing injustices perpetrated by tribal governments, on the one hand, and, on
the other, avoiding undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people.’”).
53 It might seem that since ICRA was enacted in 1968 that 2018 is its fiftieth year. However,
its 2018 anniversary will mark the end of its fiftieth year and the beginning of its fifty-first.
Accordingly, 2017 is the closest approximation to the fiftieth year of ICRA’s enactment.
54 For a comprehensive survey of Indian law in 2017, see generally Grant Christensen, A
View from American Courts: The Year in Indian Law 2017, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2018).
55 Consider for example Morales-Alfonso v. Francisco Enters, CV 15-0200-TUC-JAS
(LAB), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69058 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2017). In Morales-Alfonso, the plain-
tiff brought an ICRA claim in federal court alleging the Tohono O’odham Nation had violated
his rights when it forced him to leave a swap meet held on the tribe’s reservation. Id. at *1–2.
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the breadth of ICRA cases, three groupings suggested themselves as proper ways to
categorize the most important cases from 2017. These categories capture a snapshot
of ICRA fifty years after its enactment, providing an opportunity for fair critique
and evaluation.
This section is dedicated to telling the stories of persons seeking relief under
ICRA in 2017 as a method of qualitative evaluation. Notably, all of these cases
involve Indians who have been convicted in tribal court and are now seeking release
on the basis that the tribal court denied them their rights under ICRA.56
The first section discusses the only remedy that is available under ICRA—the
writ of habeas corpus.57 Literally translated as “you have the body,”58 it is well es-
tablished that habeas traditionally is only available when a petitioner has been de-
tained.59 However, the question of what constitutes detention continues to attract the
attention of courts reviewing ICRA claims. The second section will tell the story of
defendants who have been incarcerated without the ability to assert their right to a
jury trial. Finally, the third section discusses the effects of tribal-court convictions,
even when uncounseled, on subsequent federal prosecutions. When the procedures
used by a tribal court comply with ICRA, but do not comply with the United States
Constitution, should convictions so obtained be recognized by federal courts for pur-
poses of meeting predicate-offense requirements in other federal criminal statutes?
A. Habeas Corpus
The Supreme Court clarified in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that the only
remedy available for a violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act is the writ of habeas
corpus.60 The writ developed at common law to bring a confined individual before
The federal court dismissed the claim, reasoning that ICRA concerned rights to which criminal
defendants are entitled in tribal court and had no application in a civil claim brought by a
non-member of the tribe in federal court. Id. at *10–11.
56 In one interesting case the defendant attempted to claim release under ICRA after he
had served his sentence issued by the tribal court, but was currently serving a sentence in a
federal detention facility for a violation of federal law issued by a federal court. Adams v.
Elwell, No. CV 17-00285 RB/SCY, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99806, at *1, *2, *4 (D.N.M.
June 26, 2017). The federal district court denied his claim for relief, reasoning that the de-
fendant was no longer detained by the tribe and therefore ICRA didn’t apply. Id. (“Petitioner
Adams is not, and was not at the time he filed this Petition, in detention by order of an Indian
tribe. . . . His current detention is by federal order, not tribal order. Therefore, the Court lacks
jurisdiction over his claim under § 1303 and will dismiss the Petition.”).
57 See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 88.
58 Alan C. Smith, More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional Convictions
to Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United States, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1338 (1995).
59 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 195 (1830).
60 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (“In 25 U.S.C. § 1303, the only remedial provision
expressly supplied by Congress, the ‘privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’ is made ‘available
to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of
an Indian tribe.’”).
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the court in order to determine whether his detention was lawful.61 Although the
habeas writ has traditionally been used in the criminal context to allow individuals
who claim to be unlawfully imprisoned to demand that they be set free, courts have
read the habeas remedy more expansively under ICRA.62
Prior to 2017, perhaps the most notable lower-court opinion concerning the
extent of the habeas remedy available in ICRA was decided by the Second Circuit.
In Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,63 Judge Cabranes held that an
accusation of treason and permanent banishment from a reservation constrained the
petitioners’ liberty enough to grant the federal court subject-matter jurisdiction to issue
a habeas writ under ICRA.64 That decision has been followed broadly by other
courts, with other federal judges using physical banishment to guide them in their
ICRA jurisprudence.65
1. Observations From 2017
In 2017, federal courts further contemplated at what point a tribe had so re-
strained the liberty of a defendant as to warrant the habeas remedy. Does a monetary
fine issued by a tribal court related to behavior surrounding a tribal election trigger
sufficient confinement to confer subject-matter jurisdiction under the Indian Civil
61 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. at 195 (“The petitioner prays the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus, to be directed to the marshal of the district of Columbia, in whose custody, as
keeper of the gaol of the district, the petitioner is, commanding him to bring the body of the
petitioner before the court, with the cause of his commitment; and especially commanding him
to return with the writ the record of the proceedings upon the indictments, with the judgments
thereupon; and to certify whether the petitioner be not actually imprisoned by the supposed
authority, and in virtue of the said judgment.”). See also id. at 201–03 (discussing the appli-
cation and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus).
62 See, e.g., Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that disenroll-
ment and subsequent banishment from the reservation constitute an attempt by the tribe to
assert sufficient control of the petitioner’s freedom to warrant habeas relief).
63 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996).
64 Id. at 896–97 (“The fact that permanent banishment has in the past been imposed as a
punitive sanction, in our culture and in others, does not mean that under the laws of the United
States it is a sanction not involving a severe restraint on liberty. Where, as here, petitioners
seek to test the legality of orders of permanent banishment, a federal district court has subject
matter jurisdiction to entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus.”).
65 See, e.g., Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that tribal disen-
rollment without subsequent banishment does not result in the petitioner being in custody for
the purposes of the habeas remedy under ICRA); Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1196
(W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding that habeas relief is appropriate when petitioners were banished
from the reservation and at least some petitioners were forcibly removed); Quair, 359 F. Supp.
2d 948; Moore v. Nelson, No. C 98-3736 MJJ, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19609 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16,
1999) (holding that habeas is not appropriate when the defendant has only been fined by the
tribe and has not been incarcerated, banished, or arrested).
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Rights Act?66 What about the loss of real property?67 While courts answered both
questions in the negative,68 courts have been more uncertain about when a restriction
on personal freedom is sufficient to justify the use of the habeas writ. The Ninth Cir-
cuit issued an opinion that the banishment of a tribal elder for eight years did not trigger
ICRA’s habeas remedy.69 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit arguably split with the
Second Circuit in Poodry, creating even more uncertainty in ICRA jurisprudence.
a. Does a Monetary Fine Trigger the Indian Civil Rights Act?
In Scudero v. Moran,70 Jim Scudero filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that his tribe, the Metlakatla Indian Community, had effectively banished him
through the imposition of fines levied in relation to a tribal election.71 A twelve-member
Community Council and a mayor govern the Metlakatla Indian Community.72 Scudero
had run for mayor in 2015.73 After losing the election, he requested that the Community
Council certify a new election based on alleged irregularities surrounding the counting
of ballots.74 After the Council denied his request, Scudero challenged the election
in tribal court.75 The tribal judge dismissed the case, and the Council sought reimburse-
ment of its legal costs in the amount of $2,355.76 Before the tribal judge could decide
the issue, Scudero filed his habeas petition in federal court asking for relief from the
imposition of costs.77 Essentially, Scudero argued that he had been “effectively
‘banished’ from the Community through improper and vindictive imposition of fines
given to him by the Community Council stemming from an illegal election.”78
Judge Sedwick of the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska recognized that
the habeas remedy in the Indian Civil Rights Act “does address more than actual
66 See Scudero v. Moran, 230 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Alaska 2017) (holding that Petitioner
did not suffer a severe restriction on liberty, which is required in order to give the district
court jurisdiction).
67 Napoles v. Rogers (Napoles II), No. 1:16-CV-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106382, at *16–17 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (holding that denial from entering one’s own lands
does not constitute banishment).
68 See Scudero, 230 F. Supp. 3d 980; Napoles II, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106382 (finding
the facts insufficient to grant habeas jurisdiction to the federal district court).
69 See Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding temporary banish-
ment not enough to trigger the habeas provision of ICRA).
70 230 F. Supp. 3d 980 (D. Alaska 2017).
71 Id. at 980.
72 Id. at 982.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 982–83.
75 Id. at 983.
76 Id. The Council also reserved the right to increase the fee should its costs continue to
rise with additional litigation. Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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physical custody,” including parole, probation, and release pending trial.79 However,
the court noted that the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the loss of tribal citizen-
ship or tribal services were not, without more, enough to trigger ICRA’s remedy.80
Judge Sedwick determined that Scudero’s claim that he was banished due to the
imposition of a monetary fine was insufficient to trigger ICRA’s habeas protections.81
The court compared the imposition of a fine, lawfully levied under tribal ordinance,
with other Ninth Circuit cases in which habeas relief was denied.82 The court
determined that the fine was a less severe restriction on Scudero’s liberty than the
loss of tribal membership or health services, which had previously been held in-
sufficient.83 While Scudero argued that he could lose his right to participate in tribal
elections if the fine was levied against him and not paid, the court reiterated that the
loss of one’s “voice” in the community is not enough to warrant habeas relief.84 The
court therefore denied the petition for the writ, but also refused to award the Metlakatla
Indian Community sanctions post-dismissal, reasoning that doing so would only
prolong the litigation and its associated costs for all parties.85
b. Does Interference with Real Property Trigger the Indian Civil Rights Act?
The second situation requiring courts to interpret the Indian Civil Rights Act’s
habeas remedy in 2017 was actually decided in two separate proceedings: the first,
79 Id. at 984 (citing Shenandoah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998)).
80 Id. (“[T]he Ninth Circuit acknowledged that actual physical custody is not necessarily
a jurisdictional requirement for habeas review under § 1303. However, it concluded that loss
of tribal citizenship and access to certain tribal facilities and services was not sufficiently severe
to constitute detention. The court stated that unlike the petitioners in Poodry, the petitioners in
Jeffredo had not been convicted of a crime and permanently banished, thereby losing all rights
afforded to tribal members.” (citing Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010))).
See also id. at 984–85 (“[D]eprivations such as the ‘loss of one’s “voice” in the community,
loss of health insurance, loss of access to tribal health and recreation facilities, loss of quarterly
distributions to tribal members, and loss of one’s place on the membership rolls of the tribe’
are insufficient to provide the federal court jurisdiction under ICRA’s habeas provision.”).
81 Id. at 985.
82 Id.
83 Id. (“[Scudero] has not been evicted from his home or had his movements restricted
in some significant way. The council’s decision to seek imposition of costs after a favorable
judgment pursuant to tribal ordinances is far less severe than what the Ninth Circuit deemed
insufficiently severe in Jeffredo—denial of access to certain tribal facilities and services and
disenrollment in the tribe. Moreover, if the loss of one’s ‘voice’ in the community, health in-
surance, and quarterly distributions is insufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction as the Ninth
Circuit indicated it would be, surely court-imposed costs for bringing an unsuccessful case
in tribal court is insufficient.”).
84 Id. (“[T]he potential threat of the loss of the right to vote is not sufficient to satisfy the de-
tention requirement of § 1303. Petitioner has not yet been denied the right to vote. Indeed, at
the time of the completion of the parties’ briefing, the tribal judge had not yet ruled on the coun-
cil’s request to impose the costs of the underlying litigation on Petitioner.” (citation omitted)).
85 Id. at 986.
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an emergency appeal to the Eastern District of California in January (Napoles I)86
and the second, following ordinary motion practice, decided in July (Napoles II).87
In both cases, the petitioners sought assistance from federal courts to prevent the
Bishop Paiute Tribe from interfering with their interest in real property.88
In Napoles I, a group of petitioners claimed that they were all descendants of Ida
Warlie and heirs to her assignment of land on the Bishop Paiute Tribe’s reservation.89
They had, at various times, successfully applied for assignments of this land from
Ida Warlie’s original parcel.90 In 2006, the Bishop Paiute Tribe began to cancel these
assignments and seize the lands for the purpose of expanding the Tribe’s casino.91
In 2013, the Tribal Council took steps to prepare the land for the casino’s expansion,
including regularly dispatching tribal officers to the land occupied by the petitioners
and issuing trespass citations.92 At the Tribe’s request, the tribal court ultimately
issued a temporary restraining order preventing the petitioners from accessing the prop-
erty.93 The petitioners sought emergency relief from the federal court under ICRA.94
The federal court dismissed the petitioners’ motion.95 The court reasoned that
the motion did not qualify for emergency action because the petitioners could not
show that the potential harm they alleged was so immediate as to justify emergency
action by the court.96 The court further justified its denial of the petitioners’ request
for relief by noting that the petitioners did not serve the Tribe with proper notice of
their emergency petition.97
86 Napoles v. Rogers (Napoles I), No. 1:16-CV-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
452 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2017).
87 Napoles v. Rogers (Napoles II), No. 1:16-CV-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
106382 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2017).
88 See Napoles II, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106382; Napoles I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 452.
89 Napoles I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 452, at *1.
90 Id. at *1–2.
91 Id. at *2.
92 Id.
93 Id. at *3.
94 Id. at *4–5.
95 Id. at *9.
96 Id. at *7–8 (“[P]etitioners have neither alleged nor stated in a sworn affidavit any facts
to suggest that they face a risk of immediate and irreparable injury in the time that it would take
for the opposition parties to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, petitioners
have made no showing that potential construction of the proposed casino expansion, its
commencement still months away, justifies action by this court without a hearing.”).
97 Id. at *8–9 (“In his declaration, petitioners’ counsel explains he ‘do[es] not believe that
the Tribal Council, the Court or Tribal Judge Kockenmeister, as shown by their actions to date
will agree to a temporary restraining order prior to the March 21, 2017 hearing date when
construction is underway.’ Counsel’s explanation for his failure to notify the respondents is in-
sufficient: the unlikeliness of respondents to agree to a stipulated temporary restraining order
is no justification for a refusal [to] provide notice of petitioner’s application completely.”
(citation omitted)).
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Because the emergency petition was denied, the parties proceeded with tradi-
tional motion practice, and the issue of ICRA’s applicability returned to the court
six months later.98 In Napoles II, the plaintiffs petitioned the court for relief with a
writ of habeas corpus.99 They sought redress for the Bishop Paiute Tribe’s denial of
access to land which the petitioners claimed was theirs under the assignments from
Ida Warlie’s estate.100 The petitioners alleged that the Tribe had threatened to take
away their buildings and livestock; to continue to cite them for trespass; and to sus-
pend certain petitioners from their jobs without pay, or fire them in retaliation if they
continued to object to the Tribe’s seizure of their lands.101
The Tribe moved to dismiss the habeas petition, arguing that the only rights-
violating activity the petitioners alleged was the imposition of civil fines which would
not result in incarceration.102 Because the only penalty stemming from the tribal-
court proceedings was money damages, the Tribe argued that, because the proceed-
ings did not qualify for the limited remedy of habeas,103 the federal court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition.104 Petitioners rejoined that the Tribe’s
behavior had resulted in their ultimate detention because the ongoing citations for
trespass amounted to a restraint on their liberty.105 Specifically, the petitioners argued
that “[a] restraint tantamount to custody exist[ed] in the instant case” because the
respondents removed them and their belongings “from their lands forever,” without
the legal authority to do so.106 Petitioners claimed this amounted to the kind of banish-
ment from which ICRA was designed to permit federal courts to grant relief.107
The district court refused to extend the definition of detention to the kind of
civil-citation practice in which the Tribe was allegedly engaging: “[T]he only pun-
ishment short of physical confinement that could potentially rise to the level of
98 See Napoles v. Rogers (Napoles II), No. 1:16-CV-01933-DAD-JLT, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 106382 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2017).
99 Id. at *1.
100 Id. at *2.
101 Id. at *5–6.
102 Id. at *7.
103 Id.
104 See id.
105 See id. at *9–10 (“[P]etitioners argue that physical custody is not required for a person
to be detained and they need only be subject to a ‘severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.’
According to petitioners, they are subject to such a restraint on their liberty because the tribal
court may continue to fine them for trespassing on the disputed land which they claim is right-
fully theirs. Petitioners contend that this is tantamount to their partial permanent banishment,
in the sense that they are permanently banished from the land they claim belongs to them.”
(citation omitted)).
106 Id. at *10.
107 See id. at *15 (“Here, petitioners argue they have been ‘permanently banished’ from their
land because they risk being issued additional citations if they reenter the property under dispute,
and that this is sufficient to constitute ‘detention’ under § 1303 . . . .”).
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detention as required by § 1303 is permanent banishment.”108 The court therefore
denied the habeas petition.109 It noted that, even assuming the petitioners’ allegations
to be true and the Tribe’s behavior to be a violation of their civil rights, “their alle-
gations [were] nonetheless simply insufficient to support a finding that a ‘detention’
ha[d] occurred within the meaning of § 1303.”110
c. Does Banishment for a Period of Years Trigger the Indian Civil Rights Act?
Unlike in Napoles or Scudero, the final habeas case decided in 2017 involved
the clear banishment of a tribal elder.111 In Tavares v. Whitehouse,112 the United
Auburn Indian Community disciplined a group of its members who, it claimed,
slandered and defamed the Tribe by withholding their per capita distributions and
member privileges and temporarily banned them from tribal lands.113
The United Auburn Indian Community’s governing five-member council had
passed an ordinance making it unlawful to defame the reputation of the Tribe or its
officials outside of a tribal forum.114 In 2011, a group of tribal members submitted
a recall petition to the Tribe’s Election Committee alleging financial mismanage-
ment, retaliation, electoral irregularity, and other challenges to the competence and
legitimacy of the tribal council.115 The petitioners also issued two press releases
detailing their complaints to local media outlets.116 In response, the Tribal Council
sent the petitioners formal notice that their media releases contained false and
defamatory statements that were published outside of a tribal forum and, as a result
of the petitioners’ actions, the Council banned Ms. Tavares from the reservation for
ten years and the other petitioners for eight years.117 The excluded members filed a
108 Id. at *14 (citing Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2017)).
109 Id. at *15 (“[P]laintiffs are not currently detained, have never been in physical custody,
and cannot face such confinement as a result of the issuance of these citations.”).
110 Id. (citing Tavares, 851 F.3d at 875–76).
111 See Tavares, 851 F.3d at 863.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 867–68.
114 See id. at 867 (“Ordinance 2004-001 III(i) requires members to ‘refrain from defaming
the reputation of the Tribe, its officials, its employees or agents outside a tribal forum[.]’ And the
Enrollment Ordinance provides that a Tribe member can be punished—up to and including
disenrollment—for making misrepresentations against the Tribe.” (alteration in original)).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 868. Petitioners also had their per-capita benefits from the tribal casino’s revenue
suspended for a limited period. Id. (“The petitioners were barred from tribal events, properties,
offices, schools, health and wellness facilities, a park, and the casino. During their terms of
exclusions, the petitioners could not run for tribal office, but they could vote in tribal elections
through absentee ballots. They were not excluded from the twenty-one privately owned parcels
of land, including their own homes and land owned by other members of the Tribe, and they
retained their tribal health care benefits.”).
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petition for habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act.118
The district court held that, because the petitioners’ punishment was not a “deten-
tion[,]” it lacked jurisdiction.119
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.120 The majority held
that the loss of financial benefits did not constitute a detention.121 It further held that
temporary banishment was not a detention: “[W]e think Congress’s use of ‘detention’
instead of ‘custody’ when it created habeas jurisdiction over tribal actions is signifi-
cant . . . . At the time Congress enacted the ICRA . . . . ‘detention’ was commonly
defined to require physical confinement.”122 The majority recognized that “petition-
ers raise[d] free speech and due process claims that implicate[d] the substantive
protections Congress saw fit to grant Indians with respect to their tribes through the
ICRA,” but concluded that a temporary exclusion was not a detention and so the
petitioners’ only redress was an appeal to the Tribe itself.123
The majority distinguished the Second Circuit’s Poodry decision, reasoning that
the habeas remedy should be limited to cases of permanent banishment coupled with
tribal disenrollment, because only those conditions were sufficiently severe as to
constitute a deprivation of liberty equivalent to incarceration.124 It emphasized the
disenrollment piece was important to the Poodry decision given its focus on the loss
of tribal citizenship.125 Because the petitioners here had not permanently been
banished or disenrolled, the court concluded that ICRA did not permit the federal
court to interfere.126 While the petitioners were denied a right protected by ICRA,
the federal court was without jurisdiction to afford them a remedy.127
118 Id. at 869.
119 Tavares v. Whitehouse, No. 2:13-CV-02101-TLN-CKD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37799
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2014).
120 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 864.
121 See id. at 870.
122 Id. at 871.
123 Id. at 878.
124 See id. at 874–75 (“Notably, the Second Circuit again conflated disenrollment and banish-
ment in its analysis. The court characterized the punishment in Poodry as considerably more
severe than the punishment in Shenandoah because in Poodry, ‘the petitioners were convicted
[ ] of treason, sentenced to permanent banishment, and stripped of . . . Indian citizenship; their
names were removed from the Tribal rolls; and they permanently [lost] any and all rights af-
forded [tribal] members.’ By contrast, the petitioners in Shenandoah ‘[did] not allege[ ] that they
were banished from the Nation, deprived of tribal membership, convicted of any crime, or that
defendants attempted in anyway [sic] to remove them from [tribal land].’” (citations omitted)).
125 See id.
126 Id. at 875.
127 Id. at 878 (“The petitioners raise free speech and due process claims that implicate the
substantive protections Congress saw fit to grant Indians with respect to their tribes through
the ICRA. (‘Section 1302 [of the ICRA] provides that no Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall do or fail to do the things set forth in Section 1302.’). But the petition-
ers’ remedy is with the Tribe, not in the federal courts.” (citations omitted)).
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Judge Wardlaw, in dissent, would not have distinguished as clearly between
“detention” and “custody,” and would have held that banishment from tribal lands for
ten years would constitute a sufficiently severe restraint on the petitioners’ liberty to
permit the court to exercise habeas jurisdiction.128 Her dissent further explained that
banishment is a unique punishment which threatens the petitioners’ very cultural
affiliation.129 Specifically, Ms. Tavares’ exclusion from all tribal properties and sur-
rounding facilities meant that she could not “walk her grandchildren to school, at-
tend tribal meetings, ceremonies, and events, or join her family and friends for any
purpose on tribal land.”130 She would have applied the Second Circuit’s logic in
Poodry to hold that the district court had jurisdiction to grant the habeas petition.131
2. Comments on the Habeas Remedy
There is nothing inherently problematic about the resolution of the first two
cases. It is perfectly fair for the petitioners in those cases to ask the federal courts to
interpret the habeas remedy to accommodate the risk that the petitioners might be
denied a voice in community decisions, or should not regularly be fined for trespass-
ing on land they believe is legally theirs. It is similarly in keeping with the limited
nature of the habeas remedy under the Indian Civil Rights Act for courts to look at
the facts of each case and determine that Congress did not intend for federal courts
to interfere with the internal affairs of the tribe in either instance. Although that
logic controls monetary fines or civil citations, banishment raises different concerns.
The dissent in Tavares rightly points out the now-contradictory treatment of
banishment by the Second and Ninth Circuits.132 A pending petition for a writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split is indicative of the
tensions inherent in the two circuits’ disparate treatment of banishment in relation
to the habeas remedy.133 In Poodry, the Second Circuit emphasized the petitioner’s
removal from the community as being the salient component of its reasoning.134
128 Id. at 880–84 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 884 (“Banishment is a uniquely severe punishment. It does ‘more than merely
restrict one’s freedom to go or remain where others have the right to be: it often works a de-
struction of one’s social, cultural, and political existence.’ Tavares’s ten-year banishment is not
‘a modest fine or a short suspension of a privilege . . . but [rather] the coerced and peremptory
deprivation of [her] membership in the tribe and [her] social and cultural affiliation.’” (internal
citations omitted)).
130 Id. at 887.
131 See id. at 885 (“[W]here a tribal member has been banished rather than imprisoned,
‘[T]he ICRA’s habeas provision [nevertheless] affords the petitioners access to a federal court
to test the legality of their ‘convict[ion]’ and subsequent ‘banishment’ from the reservation[.]’”
(citation omitted)).
132 Id. at 879–80, 882.
133 See Tavares, 851 F.3d 863, petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Sept. 21,
2017) (No. 17-429).
134 Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Indeed,
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Although the banishment in Poodry was permanent,135 there was nothing inherent
in the court’s reasoning to suggest that only a permanent banishment could suffi-
ciently injure the petitioner’s liberty interests as to trigger the habeas remedy.136
The majority opinion in Tavares claimed to have applied Poodry consistently,
distinguishing the facts in that case from the permanent banishment and disenroll-
ment experienced by the Seneca petitioners in Poodry.137 However, distinguishing
these cases based upon the facts creates a false equivalency. Habeas is supposed to
apply to anyone whose liberty is sufficiently constrained.138 Under ICRA, many tribes
retain only the equivalent of misdemeanor authority, imposing criminal sentences
that do not exceed one year.139 When ICRA was first enacted, all tribal courts were
limited to criminal penalties of no more than six months.140 Yet despite these restric-
tions, which are notably less confining than life in prison, Congress has always
permitted habeas review of an incarceration ordered by a tribal court.141
This appears to be an area of law where the unique facts of the specific cases en-
courage courts to draw fine articulations that blur the legally relevant distinctions re-
garding the treatment of defendants. I propose that courts should look at banishment
we think the existence of the orders of permanent banishment alone—even absent attempts to
enforce them—would be sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for habeas corpus.
We deal here not with a modest fine or a short suspension of a privilege—found not to satisfy
the custody requirement for habeas relief—but with the coerced and peremptory deprivation
of the petitioners’ membership in the tribe and their social and cultural affiliation.”).
135 Id.
136 See id. (“‘Restraint’ does not require ‘on-going supervision’ or ‘prior approval.’ As long
as the banishment orders stand, the petitioners may be removed from the Tonawanda Reserva-
tion at any time. That they have not been removed thus far does not render them ‘free’ or
‘unrestrained.’ While ‘supervision’ (or harassment) by tribal officials or others acting on their
behalf may be sporadic, that only makes it all the more pernicious. . . . [T]he petitioners have no
ability to predict if, when, or how their sentences will be executed. The petitioners may currently
be able to ‘come and go’ as they please, but the banishment orders make clear that at some point
they may be compelled to ‘go,’ and no longer welcome to ‘come.’ That is a severe restraint to
which the members of the Tonawanda Band are not generally subject.” (citations omitted)).
137 Tavares, 851 F.3d at 875.
138 See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
139 Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1564,
1567–68 (2016) (“Until 2010, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 limited tribal sentencing
authority to a maximum of one year in jail or a fine of $1000 per count, regardless of the
crime. This limitation remains in effect for the vast majority of American Indian tribes.” (ci-
tations omitted)).
140 Id. at 1581.
141 See Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895 (“To determine the severity of the sanction, we need only
look to the orders of banishment themselves, which suggest that banishment is imposed (without
notice) only for the most severe of crimes: murder, rape, and treason. Had the petitioners been
charged with lesser offenses and been subjected to the lesser punishment of imprisonment,
there is no question that a federal court would have the power to inquire into the legality of
the tribe’s action.”).
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as actual incarceration. Banishment creates a prison cell; however, unlike incarcera-
tion in a physical jailhouse, the prison cell is the entire world outside tribal lands,
and the reservation is the free world outside the prison walls.
Traditional habeas jurisprudence has never had occasion to consider whether the
size of the cell would affect the availability of the remedy.142 It should not. As
Justice Black wrote in 1963:
Of course, [the] writ always could and still can reach behind
prison walls and iron bars. But it can do more. It is not now and
never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has
grown to achieve its grand purpose—the protection of individu-
als against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints
upon their liberty.143
It is undeniable that, for a tribal member, the exclusion from tribal lands is a mean-
ingful and measurable restriction on liberty because it closes off sacred sites to
which the member may have a cultural and perhaps even religious connection.144
Nor should the absence of disenrollment or loss of voting rights act to remove
the jurisdiction of the federal court. Even when the individual is correspondingly not
disenrolled and expressly is permitted to continue to vote in tribal elections, the use
of an absentee ballot is meaningfully different than direct participation.145 The tribal
member may lose access to interpreter services or be denied the right to cast their
ballot on the day of the election, and thus forgo important information needed for
him to be politically informed.146
142 Smith, supra note 58, at 1338 (“The Latin phrase ‘habeas corpus’ literally means ‘you
have the body,’ and thus the original writ demanded that the prisoner’s custodian bring the
prisoner before the court. In accord with this history, all federal habeas statutes have required
that the petitioner be ‘in custody’ to utilize the writ. . . . Despite the jurisdictional importance
of the custody requirement, Congress has never defined its meaning. The term ‘custody’ clearly
encompasses physical confinements, but the Supreme Court has construed it more broadly,
finding that even less severe restrictions on liberty constitute ‘custody’ for habeas corpus pur-
poses.” (citations omitted)).
143 Id. (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 243).
144 Poodry, 85 F.3d at 895 (“We deal here not with a modest fine or a short suspension of
a privilege—found not to satisfy the custody requirement for habeas relief—but with the
coerced and peremptory deprivation of the petitioners’ membership in the tribe and their social
and cultural affiliation.”).
145 Courts have recently found the use of absentee voting instead of in-person voting, es-
pecially when targeting Indian people, to be a violation of their rights. See Navajo Nation Human
Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., No. 2:16-CV-00154-JNP-BCW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145159 (D. Utah, Sept. 7, 2017); Poor Bear v. Cty. of Jackson, No. 5:14-CV-5059-KES, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57762 (D.S.D. May 1, 2015).
146 See Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145159, at *64–72;
Poor Bear, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57762, at *20–24.
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The apparent split between the Second and Ninth Circuits could be easy to re-
solve by returning to first principles. The habeas remedy is available when an
individual alleges that he has had his liberty restricted for an improper purpose.147
Tribes should not be able to escape a review of their decisions by banishing a tribal
member for a period of years instead of incarcerating her. A banishment from tribal
lands is a physical restriction on the liberty of the banished tribal member, and
therefore a federal court should have jurisdiction to review the protections afforded
that banished individual in his tribal-court proceedings.
This is not to say that ultimately Ms. Tavares should have her banishment lifted.
Importantly, the habeas remedy in ICRA affords federal courts subject-matter juris-
diction over challenges to a tribal member’s detention on the basis that his rights
have been violated, but it does not automatically require a reversal.148 If the tribal
sanction was warranted based upon a violation of tribal law, and the tribal charges
as well as procedures were not prohibited by ICRA, a federal court should still uphold
the banishment in the same way that it would dismiss a petition for a writ by an
incarcerated tribal member.149
B. The Right to a Jury Trial
In most state and federal proceedings, the defendant has a right to a jury trial
because that right is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.150
147 See Smith, supra note 58, at 1338.
148 See Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal
Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85, 90 (2007). The habeas remedy in 25 U.S.C. § 1303 only confers
jurisdiction upon the federal court; it does not mandate the outcome of that review. Id. at 90–91
(“[R]espect for tribal sovereignty requires restraint in extra-tribal judicial review and over-
sight of tribal banishment and exclusion decisions.”). Deputy Solicitor Kunesh’s article is
an exceptional study of the history of the practice of banishment and a compelling argument
in favor of tribes being able to impose the sanction subject to their own laws and customs.
149 For example, consider another 2017 ICRA case, Darnell v. Merchant, No. 17-03063-
EFM-TJJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195793 (D. Kan., Nov. 29, 2017). In Merchant, Petitioner
argued that her conviction was motivated by a desire to harass. Id. at *14. Petitioner provided
several reasons, each of which was rejected by the court. See id. at *14–26. For example,
during jury selection, one juror claimed she had trouble hearing, and two others responded
they were fearful they could lose their jobs. Id. at *3–4. Petitioner claimed that the errors in
jury selection showed bad faith, but the district court disagreed. Id. at *14. The court recognized
that the tribal judge responded to the concerns; he asked the juror who was hard of hearing
if she could hear the judge from the bench, and reassured the other potential jurors that they
could not be fired for serving on a jury. Id. at *18. Such a practice did not show bad faith or
a desire to harass on the part of the tribal court. Id.
150 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
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While the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings, the Indian
Civil Rights Act provides the same guarantee to tribal defendants, although it requires
that they request the jury trial: “In general . . . [n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers
of self-government shall . . . deny to any person accused of an offense punishable
by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six per-
sons.”151 The right is not illusory but clearly stated on the face of the Act.152 It is
incumbent upon tribes to ensure their laws permit tribal members to take advantage
of the right to request a trial by jury.153
ICRA’s right to a jury trial has regularly been litigated before tribal courts,
giving tribal appellate bodies the ability to develop tribal precedent on the right to
request a jury trial. These courts have held that the right does not apply to civil
proceedings, because the plain language of ICRA extends the right to a jury only
when the defendant is accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment.154 Like-
wise, the right does not attach when the defendant could not face imprisonment for
the criminal charges levied against him.155 ICRA’s jury-trial provision has also been
challenged in federal courts.156 The Ninth Circuit has recently held that when a
defendant is not advised of his right to request a jury trial, the tribe violates the de-
fendant’s rights under ICRA.157
1. Recent Observations on the Indian Civil Rights Act’s Right to a Jury Trial
Although the issue of requesting a jury trial has been comparatively rarely
litigated in the context of the Indian Civil Rights Act, in 2017 the issue of the right
to a jury trial was at the forefront of a series of cases arising out of the Pueblos of
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).
151 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10) (2012). For a more detailed academic discussion of the right
to a jury trial conferred by ICRA, see Rosen, supra note 32, at 555–57.
152 § 1302(a)(10).
153 See id.
154 See Shippentower v. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation of Oregon,
20 Indian L. Rep. 6026 (Umatilla Tribal Ct. 1993); Rosen, supra note 32, at 555.
155 See Pueblo of Pojoaque v. Jagles, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6137 (Pojoaque Pueblo Tribal Ct.
1997); Rosen, supra note 32, at 555.
156 See, e.g., Fragua v. Casamento, No. CV 16-1404 RB/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69534 (D.N.M. May 8, 2017) (addressing if ICRA was violated by the Jemez Tribal Court
because it did not provide for right to trial by jury).
157 Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Alvarez’s right to ‘fair treat-
ment’ includes the right to know that he would forfeit his right to a jury unless he affirmatively
requested one. The Community concedes that Alvarez ‘was not advised that he had to ask
for’ a jury. . . . Tribal defendants are accorded those rights without having to take affirmative
steps to invoke them. To make the same unqualified statement as to a right that must be affir-
matively invoked is misleading.”). Retrial was denied, however, on the basis of failure to
exhaust. See id. at 1027–28.
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New Mexico. The federal district court broadly reaffirmed the right to a jury trial
under ICRA, repeatedly holding that the Pueblos needed both to inform the accused
of their right to a jury trial and to have a formal, tribally led process in place for
empaneling a jury.158 Consider the following cases from 2017.
In Fragua v. Casamento,159 the petitioner Fragua requested that the New Mexico
district court grant him habeas relief from his Pueblo of Jemez Tribal Court convic-
tion of aggravated battery.160 His appeal was based upon his contention that the
Tribe neither informed him of his right to counsel, even at his own expense, nor did
it tell him that he had a right to a jury trial.161 Moreover, Fragua argued that the
Pueblo of Jemez had no formal legal process to empanel a jury, making any right to
a jury trial illusory.162
The federal court first determined that the tribal code did not provide an avenue
to request post-conviction relief, and so Fragua did not need to launch any further
appeals to exhaust his tribal remedies before the federal court could consider
granting a habeas petition.163 The court then proceeded to the merits and determined
it needed only to consider the denial of right to a trial by jury in order to grant the
requested relief.164 It reasoned that “the jury issue should be dispositive. Because
Fragua was never informed of his right to trial by jury, he could not be expected to
request one.”165 The court found the lack of a tribal process to offer jury trials par-
ticularly problematic: “Indeed, even if Fragua had requested a trial by jury, the
Jemez Tribal Code has no mechanism for providing a jury trial. Because denial of
the right to a jury trial is a structural defect, it requires automatic reversal.”166 The
magistrate recommended that the habeas petition be granted, and the district court
agreed.167 A second order was issued by the district court for Fragua’s brother on
substantially identical facts.168
158 See, e.g., Fragua, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69534.
159 Id.
160 Id. at *2.
161 Id. at *3 (“Fragua contends that he was constructively denied the right to counsel
because he was not informed of that option until the morning of trial, and that he was con-
structively denied the right to a jury trial because the Pueblo of Jemez has no mechanism for
providing a jury trial and because he was never informed of that right.”).
162 Id.
163 Id. at *4 (“When no remedies are available, it is not incumbent upon an unrepresented
criminal defendant to navigate or, in this case, create avenues of appeal in order to meet the
exhaustion requirement.”).
164 Id. at *6.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Fragua v. Elwell, No. 1:16-CV-01404-RB-WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76842 (D.N.M.
May 19, 2017).
168 Fragua v. Elwell, No. 1:16-CV-01405-RB-LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77701 (D.N.M.
May 22, 2017).
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In Toya v. Casamento,169 the petitioner Toya, a member of the Pueblo of Jemez,
sought habeas relief under ICRA from his conviction by the Pueblo of Jemez Tribal
Court for aggravated DUI.170 He argued that the relief was appropriate because he
was denied his right to counsel and his right to a jury trial.171 The respondent, in both
this and the previously discussed Fragua proceedings,172 was Al Casamento—the
director of the Sandoval County Detention Center—who had physical control of the
petitioner.173 However, unlike in the Fragua cases, this time the respondent argued
that the petitioner had failed to name a member of the Tribe as a respondent,174 thus
the court would be unable to offer complete relief.175 The court found this argument
by Casamento persuasive.176 It cited the Second Circuit’s decision in Poodry for the
proposition that “full relief [could not] be granted because an order to the custodian
directing release of the prisoner [did] not modify or vacate the underlying tribal
conviction in the absence of a tribal official.”177 The court granted dismissal to
Casamento and gave Toya thirty days to substitute an appropriate tribal party who
could give relief from the tribal judgment.178
Toya ultimately joined the tribal judge, Judge Toledo, and proceeded with his
ICRA claim in federal court.179 The federal court provided additional facts about his
conviction for aggravated DUI180: he was charged and convicted of four crimes in
the Pueblo of Jemez Tribal Court after being found “passed out” in his vehicle with
169 No. CV 17-00258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80091 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).
170 Id. at *1–2.
171 Id.
172 Fragua v. Casamento, No. 1:16-CV-01405-RB-LF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73953, at
*1 (D.N.M. May 12, 2017); Fragua v. Casamento, No. CV 16-1404 RB/WPL, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69534, at *1 (D.N.M. May 8, 2017).
173 Toya, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80091, at *2.
174 Id.
175 Id. at *3–4 (“In a habeas corpus proceeding, the custodian or official having immediate
physical custody of the petitioner is a proper party to the proceeding. However, where the
petition collaterally attacks the petitioner’s tribal conviction and sentence, rather than the man-
ner in which the detention is being carried out, the immediate physical custodian may lack
the authority to afford the relief requested by the petitioner. In these circumstances, the
proper respondent is not necessarily the person with immediate physical custody but, instead,
the official with authority to modify the tribal conviction or sentence.” (citation omitted)).
176 See id. at *7 (“Unlike prior cases, Respondent Casamento has raised the necessary
party issue in his Answer . . . . [T]he Court cannot afford complete relief in the absence of
joinder of an appropriate tribal official.”).
177 Id. at *5–6 (citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,
899–900 (2d Cir. 1996)).
178 Id. at *7–8. It is insufficient to join the Tribe itself, as the Tribe has sovereign immunity
and would be immune from suit. See id. at *7 (“Petitioner Toya originally named the Pueblo
of Jemez as a respondent, but the Pueblo was dismissed based on sovereign immunity.”).
179 Toya v. Toledo, No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160173, at *1,
*5 (D.N.M. Sept. 9, 2017).
180 See id. at *2.
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the engine still running.181 Toya pled guilty and signed a form indicating his ac-
knowledgment that he was advised of the rights stated under Rule 3 of the Pueblo’s
Rules of Criminal Procedure.182 The court noted that, “[a]s written, there [was] no
mention of the right to a jury trial or an attorney in Rule 3.”183 When he appeared
before the tribal judge for sentencing, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, re-
quested a jury trial, and asked for a lawyer.184 The tribal judge denied his requests,
telling him that he “should have asked for an attorney and a [jury] trial before he
pled guilty.”185 Ultimately, Toya was sentenced to 270 days in jail.186
After adding Judge Toledo as a respondent, Toya filed a motion for habeas relief
under § 1303 of ICRA.187 Toledo first argued that Toya had not exhausted his tribal
remedies because, among other reasons, he did not appeal his conviction to the
Governor of the Pueblo.188 The federal magistrate disagreed that exhaustion was
required and proceeded to consider the habeas petition.189 On the merits of the
request, the federal magistrate concluded that Toya had been denied his right to a
jury trial, affirming that “a tribal defendant’s ‘right to “fair treatment” includes the
right to know that he would forfeit his right to a jury unless he affirmatively re-
quested one,’ and that a Tribe ‘must inform defendants of the nature of their rights,
including what must be done to invoke them.’”190 The federal court concluded that
the tribal court never informed Toya of his right to request a jury trial and then, after
he affirmatively requested one, denied him that right.191 Moreover, the federal court
concluded that while the tribal criminal code referenced the idea of a jury trial, there
were no procedures in place to empanel one or otherwise allow a defendant before
181 Id. at *1–2 (“Based on these events Petitioner was charged with four crimes: aggravated
driving under the influence, liquor violation, driving on a revoked or suspended license, and
open container.”).
182 Id. at *2–3.
183 Id. at *3.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at *4 (“Judge Toledo sentenced Petitioner to 180 days incarceration for the DUI and
90 days incarceration for the liquor violation, for a total of 270 days confinement.”).
187 Id. at *1, *5.
188 Id. at *5–6, *8.
189 Id. at *6, *8–9, *11 (“The problem for Respondents is that the remedies they speak of
‘are available in theory, but not in fact.’ Respondents point to ‘custom and tradition’ and
contend that Petitioner’s avenue for direct appeal was clear, as ‘it is the Governor and Tribal
Council that make the final decisions.’ . . . [But] I recommend that the presiding judge de-
termine that ‘[b]ecause the Jemez Tribal Code does not provide any avenue for seeking post-
conviction relief, any attempt at pursuing post-conviction relief would have been futile.’”
(citations omitted)).
190 Id. at *13, *15 (citing Alvarez v. Lopez, 835 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2016)).
191 Id. at *14 (“Here, the Tribe failed to inform Petitioner of his right to a trial by jury at
his request at his arraignment. And, when he requested one, the same was denied by Judge
Toledo . . . .”).
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the tribal court to exercise the right to a jury.192 The federal magistrate recommended
to the federal district court that it should find a clear violation of ICRA’s guarantee of
a right to request a jury trial, reverse Toya’s conviction, and order his release.193 The
federal district judge adopted the magistrate’s recommendation two weeks later.194
The denial of a right to a jury trial by Pueblos in New Mexico was an issue in
2017 that was not unique to the Jemez Pueblo. However, like the original Toya
ruling,195 the other cases out of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico
struggled to determine the appropriate respondent. In Garcia v. Elwell,196 the peti-
tioner, an enrolled member of the Kewa Pueblo, was convicted of intoxication and
criminal mischief and sentenced to an eighteen month incarceration.197 The peti-
tioner sought a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was denied the right to a jury
trial.198 The federal court allowed the petition to proceed against the current warden
of the petitioner’s detention facility and the tribal judge, but dismissed the other
parties who were no longer responsible for the petitioner’s current incarceration.199
It ordered the remaining respondents to answer the petition within thirty days.200
A similar difficulty emerged from the Pueblo of Santa Ana. In Talk v. Southern
UTE Detention Center,201 the petitioner sought habeas relief under § 1303 from a
Santa Ana Tribal Court conviction for a DUI which resulted in a sentence of 364
days of incarceration.202 The petitioner alleged that he was a hitchhiker and was
never behind the wheel of any vehicle.203 Before the court could reach the merits of
his argument, it needed to determine that all of the proper parties were before the
court.204 It reasoned that the petitioner needed to do more than merely serve the
detention center because an order releasing him did not reverse the underlying con-
viction and could result in his eventual rearrest.205 It therefore delayed proceedings
192 Id.
193 Id. at *14–15.
194 Toya v. Toledo, No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159059, at *1
(D.N.M. Sept. 26, 2017).
195 See Toya v. Casamento, No. CV 17-00258 JCH/KBM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80091,
at *2, *5–7 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).
196 No. CV 17-00333 WJ/GJF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80303 (D.N.M. May 25, 2017).
197 Id. at *2.
198 Id.
199 See id. at *5–9. The district court determined that the proper party to a habeas action
is the party with the power to free the defendant. Id. at *5–7. The court applied this principle
to dismiss those parties related to a detention facility where Petitioner was no longer incar-
cerated. See id. at *5, *7–9. It also dismissed the tribe because sovereign immunity is a defense
even to a habeas action filed under ICRA. See id. at *7.
200 Id. at *9.
201 No. 1:17-CV-00669 WJ/KK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129915 (D.N.M. Aug. 15, 2017).
202 Id. at *1.
203 See id.
204 See id. at *2–6.
205 See id. at *5 (“If Talk only proceeds against the detention center, full relief cannot be
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until the petitioner could also name a tribal official with the power to reverse his
conviction.206
2. Comments on the Right to a Jury Trial
Ten years after the Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted, the Supreme Court held
in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe207 that tribal courts were divested of their
inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian persons unless Congress had expressly
conferred it on them.208 In 1978, many tribes had already established robust tribal
criminal justice systems that had made express decisions about the composition of tribal
juries.209 It is therefore remarkable that in 2017 Indian tribes with fully functioning
criminal courts had not established procedures whereby a jury could be empaneled.210
Should any tribe wish to operate a criminal court, it must, at a minimum, have
developed and tested a process for jury selection. This admittedly would require a
tribe to expend resources.211 ICRA requires that only six persons sit on a jury,212 but
each tribe should decide what the proper number of jurors should be and make
accommodations for them in the courtroom. Each tribe must determine what the
prerequisite qualifications are to serve on a jury and whether it would limit the jury
pool to only members who live on the reservation or expand the eligible jury pool
to non-members.213 Regardless of the scope of the jury pool, tribes should establish
a robust and vetted process of maintaining and updating the jury pool and develop
granted because an order directing the custodian to release him does not modify or vacate the
underlying Tribal conviction in the absence of a Tribal official. This means he could be rear-
rested and incarcerated for the same crime if he returned to Santa Ana Pueblo Indian Reservation
following his release. Talk must therefore name as a respondent a tribal official who has an in-
terest in opposing the petition or affording relief as necessary.”).
206 See id. at *5–6.
207 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
208 See id. at 209–12 (“We . . . acknowledge that with the passage of [ICRA], many of the
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians only a few decades ago have disappeared. . . . But these are considerations
for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be authorized to try
non-Indians. They have little relevance to the principles which lead us to conclude that Indian
tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.”) (emphasis removed).
209 See id. at 196.
210 See supra Section II.B.1.
211 See Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty
Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 511 (1998) (“Although federal courts appear not to have been pre-
sented with the issue, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights heard complaints from tribal officials
that jury trials present insurmountable practical and financial problems for tribal courts.”).
212 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10).
213 See generally McCarthy, supra note 211, at 512–13 (discussing the different ways in
which tribes select juries, such as the Hopi limiting juries to tribal members and the Navajo
limiting juries to persons eligible to vote on the tribe’s voter rolls).
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a set of model jury instructions. Those involved with the tribal justice system, in-
cluding tribal judges, attorneys appearing before a tribal court, bailiffs, and court
reporters, need to develop procedures and be trained on how to conduct a jury trial.
A secure place for jury deliberation must be found. Without incorporating a process
to hold a jury trial, tribes cannot meaningfully give defendants an opportunity to
exercise their right under ICRA.
Moreover, the District Court of New Mexico was right when it suggested that,
although ICRA only requires that the defendant be able to request a jury trial, the
defendant must be informed of that right.214 Because of the Constitution’s limited
application in Indian country, many tribal defendants may not formally be Miran-
dized.215 In fact, full Miranda warnings would be misleading because ICRA does not
always require that the tribe appoint counsel, but rather that the defendant have the
right to hire counsel at his own expense.216 However, at a minimum, a criminal
defendant appearing in tribal court should be informed of his right to request a jury
trial by the tribal court before entering any plea.
Failure to inform the defendant of this right is a violation of the due-process
protections extended by Congress to individuals in tribal forums, and it is appropri-
ate for federal courts meaningfully to enforce that right by granting habeas petitions
and releasing defendants whose right to a jury has been violated.217
C. Uncounseled Convictions
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment to prohibit the imposition
of a jail sentence upon any defendant without the assistance of counsel.218 That right
exists regardless of the seriousness or type of offense charged.219 However, because
214 See Fragua v. Casamento, No. CV 16-1404 RB/WPL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69534,
at *6 (D.N.M. May 8, 2017) (“Here, the jury issue should be dispositive. Because Fragua was
never informed of his right to trial by jury, he could not be expected to request one.”).
215 See, e.g., Samuel D. Newton, Note, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The Consti-
tutionality of Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal Trials
After Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489, 503–04 (2012) (discussing
United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989) where a tribal member was arrested by
a tribal police officer and arraigned in tribal court without being given any Miranda warning).
See also United States v. Peters, No. 3:16-CR-30150-RAL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56754,
at *8–10 (D.S.D. Mar. 15, 2017) (finding statements made by a non-Indian to a tribal police
officer admissible even though no Miranda warnings were given).
216 § 1302(a)(6).
217 See supra Section II.B.
218 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (incorporating the Court’s holding of a
fundamental right to a jury in federal court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), against
the states).
219 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“We hold, therefore, that absent
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Indian tribes are not bound by the Constitution, there is no inherent Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in tribal court.220 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in United States v. Bryant,
“‘[a]s separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been
regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as
limitations on federal or state authority.’ The Bill of Rights, including the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, therefore, does not apply in tribal-court proceedings.”221
United States v. Bryant, decided just two years ago, has provided some important
context to the intersection between prosecution in federal and tribal courts and the re-
spective rights enjoyed by defendants in each respective forum.222 In Bryant, the defen-
dant had multiple convictions for domestic assault in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court.223 Although many of those convictions had resulted in terms of imprisonment,
the defendant was never given counsel, because, under ICRA, counsel is only required
if the defendant is to be sentenced to more than one year in jail.224 Due to the repeated
pattern of the defendant’s domestic violence, he ultimately was prosecuted and con-
victed in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), which makes it unlawful to commit
a domestic assault in Indian country if the defendant had at least two prior convictions
of domestic violence in federal, state, or Indian tribal court.225 The defendant argued
that his federal conviction should be reversed because the tribal-court convictions,
which qualified as his predicate offenses under § 117(a), were uncounseled.226
a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether clas-
sified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”).
The Supreme Court has not, however, extended the right to counsel to those cases involving
only the threat of jail time if no jail time is imposed. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369
(1979) (“The Supreme Court of Illinois went on to state that it was ‘not inclined to extend
Argersinger’ to the case where a defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which im-
prisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually imposed upon the defendant. We
agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the Federal Constitution does not require a state
trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant such as petitioner, and we therefore
affirm its judgment.” (citation omitted)).
220 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1961–62 (2016).
221 Id. at 1962 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1963.
224 Id. at 1958–59.
225 See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp.II 2015)
(“Any person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country and who has a final
conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court pro-
ceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal jurisdiction—[an] assault, sexual
abuse, or [a] serious violent felony against a spouse or intimate partner[,] . . . shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years, or both, except that if substantial bodily
injury results from violation under this section, the offender shall be imprisoned for a term of
not more than 10 years.”).
226 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958–59 (“Bryant’s tribal-court convictions, it is undisputed, were
valid when entered. This case presents the question whether those convictions, though un-
counseled, rank as predicate offenses within the compass of § 117(a).”).
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, reasoned that the tribal-court convic-
tions did qualify as predicate offenses because they were valid when they were
issued.227 While the Constitution and its attendant Sixth Amendment rights do not
apply in Indian country, ICRA affords “a range of procedural safeguards to tribal-
court defendants ‘similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment.’”228 Justice Ginsburg recognized that, unlike the
Sixth Amendment, ICRA does not provide a defendant a right to counsel when faced
with charges that carry a criminal penalty of less than one year in jail, but instead only
permits the defendant to be represented by counsel procured at his own expense.229
The Court ultimately held that the use of the tribal-court convictions as the required
predicate offenses for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) was proper because there
was no violation of the defendant’s rights when the convictions were issued230: “It
would be ‘odd to say that a conviction untainted by a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment triggers a violation of that same amendment when it’s used in a subsequent
case where the defendant’s right to appointed counsel is fully respected.’”231
1. The Recent Evolution of Tribal Court Convictions as Predicate Offenses
Bryant provided a definitive resolution to the question of what effect a tribal-
court conviction has on federal proceedings and related questions regarding the
interplay between the right to counsel contemplated by the Indian Civil Rights Act
and that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Bryant’s holding, however, continues
to have reverberations across Indian country. In 2017, lower courts worked to unpack
the meaning of Bryant and apply it to other situations where defendants have raised
potential violations of their rights under ICRA.
227 See id.
228 Id. at 1962 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).
229 Id. (“The right to counsel under ICRA is not coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right.
If a tribal court imposes a sentence in excess of one year, ICRA requires the court to accord the
defendant ‘the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the
United States Constitution,’ including appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant at the
tribe’s expense. § 1302(c)(1)–(2). If the sentence imposed is no greater than one year, however,
the tribal court must allow a defendant only the opportunity to obtain counsel ‘at his own
expense.’ § 1302(a)(6). In tribal court, therefore, unlike in federal or state court, a sentence
of imprisonment up to one year may be imposed without according indigent defendants the
right to appointed counsel.”).
230 Id. at 1965 (“Bryant’s 46-month sentence for violating § 117(a) punishes his most recent
acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal court. Bryant was denied no
right to counsel in tribal court, and his Sixth Amendment right was honored in federal court,
when he was ‘adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for which he was imprisoned.’” (quoting
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 664 (2002))).
231 Id. (quoting United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (2014) (Watford, J., concurring)).
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The most notable opinion in the last year on the effect of a tribal-court judgment
and the interplay with ICRA emerged from Arizona.232 In State v. Lopez, the defendant
was convicted of ‘child molesting’ in Tohono O’odham tribal court and sentenced
to 360 days in tribal jail after a judicial proceeding in which he was uncounseled.233
He subsequently pled guilty in state court for failure to register as a sex offender,
and in that proceeding did not challenge his tribal conviction.234 Three years later,
the defendant was again charged with failure to register as a sex offender.235 In this
second state proceeding he did contest the state’s use of his uncounseled tribal
conviction, arguing that because he was not given an attorney, the conviction was
unconstitutional, and thus he had no duty to register.236
The Arizona trial court held that the uncounseled tribal-court conviction de-
prived the defendant of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to counsel.237
It reasoned that because the state had an obligation to ensure that the predicate
conviction was constitutionally obtained, the state had failed to satisfy a required
element of the offense.238 The state appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal
the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Bryant.239
The Arizona appellate court revisited the trial court’s decision in light of the
Supreme Court’s new direction that other courts are to recognize tribal-court judg-
ments, even if obtained using processes or procedures which would otherwise be
unconstitutional, as long as the tribal-court proceedings were valid when they were
issued.240 The appellate court determined that the tribal-court conviction was valid
when it was issued.241 It recognized that the “due process considerations under ICRA
are not necessarily coextensive with those under the United States Constitution[,]”242
and accordingly reversed the determination of the trial court that the defendant’s
conviction was “facially unconstitutional.”243
232 State v. Lopez, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2016-0076 and 2 CA-CR 2016-0122 (consolidated), 2017
WL 3187583 (Ariz. App. July 27, 2017).
233 Id. at *1.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. (“[T]he trial court concluded Lopez’s tribal court conviction was facially unconstitu-
tional, and thus the state ‘ha[d] failed to satisfy an element of the pending charges against
[him].’” (quoting State v. McCann, 21 P.3d 845, 849 (2001))).
238 Id. at 1 n.2 (citing McCann, 21 P.3d at 849).
239 Id. at *1.
240 Id. at *2.
241 Id. at *3 (“Lopez concedes ‘Bryant is dispositive of . . . the trial court’s ruling’ with
regard to the constitutionality of his uncounseled conviction. That case makes clear that an
otherwise valid but uncounseled tribal court conviction, where a defendant is sentenced to
a term of less than one year, comports with both the Constitution and ICRA.”).
242 Id.
243 Id. (“Because Lopez was sentenced to a 360-day term of incarceration, the trial court’s
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But what if the predicate offense explicitly required the prior conviction to be
counseled? In United States v. Long,244 the defendant was charged with several criminal
violations including being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.245 Under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), “it is unlawful for any person ‘who has been convicted in any court
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ to possess a firearm in or affecting in-
terstate commerce . . . .”246 Section 921(a)(33)(B)(i), however, provides that “[a] person
shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of this
chapter, unless . . . the person was represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to counsel in the case . . . .”247 In Long, the predicate
domestic-violence offense, which the government argued made the defendant ineligible
to own a firearm, was a conviction in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s tribal court.248
The Eighth Circuit cited Bryant when it recognized that ICRA, unlike the Con-
stitution, did not require the defendant to be provided with counsel in his tribal court
proceeding.249 The court concluded that there was therefore nothing constitutionally
wrong with the defendant’s tribal-court conviction.250
However, unlike in Bryant or Lopez, the defendant was not entirely uncounseled.251
Instead, the defendant had been represented by a tribal lay advocate—an individual
who was not law trained, and was not a member of the South Dakota Bar nor a licensed
attorney—who was approved to practice in front of the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court.252
A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled that the tribal court conviction was sufficient
to trigger the federal statute making Mr. Long a person prohibited from owning fire-
arms.253 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the statute’s requirement that the defendant
be represented by counsel “in the case” meant that he only needed to be represented by
someone recognized to appear before the court prosecuting the criminal case.254 The lay
conclusion that Lopez’s tribal court conviction was ‘facially unconstitutional’ because it was
uncounseled is incorrect and the court’s ruling must be vacated.”).
244 870 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2017).
245 Id. at 743.
246 Id. at 745.
247 Id. at 745–46.
248 Id. at 745.
249 Id. at 747 (“Under [ICRA], a criminal defendant in tribal-court proceedings is entitled
to appointed counsel when a sentence of more than one year’s imprisonment is imposed.”).
250 Id. (“Because Long was sentenced to 365 days’ imprisonment, with 305 days sus-
pended, in the underlying tribal-court proceeding, any right that Long had to appointed counsel
could have come only from Rosebud tribal law.”).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. (“Because lay counsel are admitted to practice before the tribal court, we conclude
that Long was represented by counsel in the tribal-court proceeding within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B), and that his conviction there thus constituted a valid predicate
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).”).
2018] CIVIL RIGHTS NOTES 395
advocate was entitled to practice in tribal court, therefore the defendant was repre-
sented by counsel.255
Judge Colloton dissented.256 He argued that a lay advocate should not qualify as
counsel for purposes of the federal statute because that is not the common under-
standing or expectation of defendants in the criminal justice system.257 Applying that
principle to the federal statute restricting the purchase of firearms for persons con-
victed of domestic-violence offenses when represented by counsel, Judge Colloton
would have concluded that Long’s tribal conviction did not qualify.258 Because his
dissent read the statute as requiring a predicate domestic-violence offense where the
defendant was represented by counsel, he would have reversed the conviction.259
2. Comment on the Effect of a Tribal Conviction
Lopez and Long illustrate the ongoing tension between the Constitution and the
Indian Civil Rights Act that still exists even now, fifty years after ICRA’s original
enactment. Because ICRA does not guarantee that tribal courts will acknowledge the
same set of procedural rights in a criminal proceeding as those afforded by the Con-
stitution, there are Indians receiving convictions in tribal courts that would otherwise
be unconstitutional in state or federal courts.260 The fact that American Indians are
also United States citizens raises the issue of potential discrimination against a group
of Americans on the basis of an immutable characteristic.261
255 Id.
256 Id. at 748.
257 Id. at 749 (“The ordinary meaning of ‘counsel’ in the legal context conveyed by the
phrase ‘represented by counsel’ is a lawyer.”).
258 Id. at 750 (“When Long was convicted of a misdemeanor in the tribal court, he was not
represented by a lawyer in the case. Therefore, he was not ‘represented by counsel in the case’
within the meaning of § 921(a)(33)(B)(i)(i).”).
259 Id.
260 Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79
NEB. L. REV. 577, 646 (2000) (discussing the differences between the due process clause of
ICRA and the Constitution); Newton, supra note 215, at 508–09 (discussing the pre-Bryant
circuit split on whether a tribal-court judgment that was procedurally sound if issued by a
tribal court, but unconstitutional if issued by a state or federal court, should be used as predi-
cate offenses).
261 Courts traditionally have fudged this question. It has long been established that federal
courts may treat Indians differently on the basis of their status as Indians. The Supreme Court
has justified this as being different treatment on the basis of a political rather than racial attribute.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The Court specifically has upheld separate treatment
for purposes of federal criminal law. In addition to Bryant, see United States v. Antelope, 430
U.S. 641, 649 n.11 (1977) (“It should be noted, however, that this Court has consistently upheld
federal regulations aimed solely at tribal Indians, as opposed to all persons subject to federal
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Constitution itself provides support for legislation directed specifically
at the Indian tribes. As the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, the Constitution therefore
‘singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation.’”).
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The Supreme Court in Bryant did nothing to resolve this tension. Instead, the
Court appeared to have extended the inequalities by allowing Indian defendants to
be guaranteed fewer due-process rights than their fellow citizens, and then, when
they are convicted without the benefit of trained legal counsel, have those uncounseled
convictions held against them as predicate offenses permitting enhanced federal
criminal penalties.262 Exacerbating the inequality, Congress’s recent extension of the
Violence Against Women Act permits tribal courts to assert criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians for certain domestic-violence offenses, but requires the tribal court
to ensure a licensed attorney for those prosecutions.263
It is difficult to suggest that the better answer is to require tribal courts to comply
with all constitutional guarantees. After all, ICRA was enacted specifically because
the Constitution does not apply to tribes in the same way that it applies to protect the
rights of defendants in non-tribal criminal proceedings.264 In fact, Justice Ginsburg’s
decision in Bryant extended to tribal courts a degree of respect and trust. It recognized
that, although tribal-court proceedings may apply different procedures, the fact that the
procedures are different does not mean the defendant has been denied due process.265
Justice Ginsburg’s unanimous opinion placed a lot of trust in the emerging profes-
sionalism of tribal courts.266
262 United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1966 (2016) (“Because Bryant’s tribal-court
convictions occurred in proceedings that complied with ICRA and were therefore valid when
entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a § 117(a) prosecution does not
violate the Constitution.”).
263 Shefali Singh, Closing the Gap of Justice: Providing Protection for Native American
Women Through the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction Provision of VAWA,
28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 219–20 (2004) (“The VAWA Amendment states that all the
rights listed in the Indian Civil Rights Act must be upheld, but [ICRA] only requires Indian
tribes to give free counsel to indigent defendants who are charged with crimes with a sentence
of more than one year. . . . [However,] [t]he Act also states, ‘if a term of imprisonment of any
length may be imposed,’ a tribe must provide ‘all rights described in section 202(c)’ of the
Indian Civil Rights Act, which includes ‘providing an indigent defendant the assistance of
a defense attorney licensed to practice law[.]’” (alterations in original) (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c)(2) (2006))).
264 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). ICRA provides similar but not
identical rights to those guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 60–61 (“We note at the outset that
a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of Title I was to ‘secur[e] for the American
Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect
individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.’” (alteration in
original) (citing S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5–6 (1967))).
265 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966 (“ICRA itself requires tribes to ensure ‘due process of law,’
and it accords defendants specific procedural safeguards resembling those contained in the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Proceedings in compliance with ICRA,
Congress determined, and we agree, sufficiently ensure the reliability of tribal-court convic-
tions. Therefore, the use of those convictions in a federal prosecution does not violate a
defendant’s right to due process.” (citation omitted)).
266 Id. The opinion was 9–0, but Justice Thomas did write a concurrence expressing concern
about the plenary power of Congress in the area of Indian affairs.
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The Kansas state courts have developed a better approach: the application of
lenity.267 Bryant is clear that a tribal-court criminal conviction that complies with all
of the rights established by ICRA can serve as a predicate offense for purposes of
federal criminal jurisdiction.268 However, when there is any doubt as to what the
tribal court decided, the rule of lenity should be invoked to protect tribal criminal
defendants. Lenity suggests that when there is ambiguity, that ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of the accused.269 Such an approach properly balances the recog-
nized interest of the government to have enhanced criminal penalties and restrictions
apply to repeat offenders, while also protecting the tribal defendants whose tribal-
court proceedings are ultimately subject to a different set of procedural safeguards.
Applying this principle of lenity to the two cases described above yields a
consistent result that both safeguards the interests of the state and protects the rights
of the defendant. In Lopez, the defendant was convicted of child molestation—an
offense which requires the convicted individual to register as a sex offender.270 The
defendant’s failure to do so has consequences under state law,271 and the defendant
should be subject to those consequences. As the Arizona appellate court ultimately
held, Bryant is directly controlling.272 There was nothing inherently improper in the
state court requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender based upon his tribal
court conviction for molestation of a minor.273
Applying the principle of lenity to Long, however, changes the result. In Long,
the federal statute required that the tribal-court conviction occur in a proceeding at
which the criminal defendant was provided with counsel.274 Long was represented
in the tribal criminal proceeding by a lay advocate who, while having experience in
the tribal court, was not trained as an attorney.275 The federal firearm statute did not
specify if counsel in the underlying proceeding was required to be trained in the
law.276 Faced with that ambiguity, the majority of the Eighth Circuit held that,
267 State v. Horselooking, 400 P.3d 189, 196 (Kan. App. 2017) (“[I]n a situation like this one
where the [tribal court] does not designate a prior conviction as a felony or a misdemeanor, we
believe that our Supreme Court would apply the rule of lenity to determine Horselooking’s
criminal history. Under the rule of lenity, when a criminal statute is silent or ambiguous on
a matter, the statute must be construed in favor of the accused.”).
268 Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966.
269 See Horselooking, 400 P.3d at 196.
270 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3821.
271 See id.
272 State v. Lopez, Nos. 2 CA-CR 2016-0076 and 2 CA-CR 2016-0122 (consolidated)
2017 WL 3187583, at *3 (Ariz. App. July 27, 2017) (“Lopez concedes ‘Bryant is dispositive
of . . . the trial court’s ruling’ with regard to the constitutionality of his uncounseled con-
viction.” (citation omitted)).
273 Id.
274 United States v. Long, 870 F.3d 741, 745–46 (8th Cir. 2017).
275 Id. at 747.
276 For different interpretations of the statute demonstrating the ambiguity, compare the
majority (“Long was represented by counsel in the tribal-court proceeding within the meaning
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because the lay advocate was permitted to practice in front of the tribal court, the
defendant’s eventual conviction occurred with the assistance of counsel.277 Lenity
would suggest a different result.
Here, there is ambiguity in the meaning of the statute. As Judge Colloton noted
in his dissent in Long, the ordinary meaning of counsel is an attorney who has been
trained in the law.278 Because the application of the federal firearm statute to the
defendant’s tribal-court conviction is ambiguous, lenity proscribes that the ambigu-
ity be resolved in favor of the accused. Notably such an application would not result
in criminals senselessly being released. The federal criminal code is sufficiently
broad to charge the defendant with other criminal offenses stemming from the same
unlawful activity—the exact situation which presented itself in that case.279 Apply-
ing the principle of lenity to federal-court offenses that use tribal-court convictions
as predicate offenses would afford a proper balance between the interests of the state
in prosecuting criminals and the protection of the accused.
CONCLUSION
Fifty years later, the Indian Civil Rights Act continues to generate controversies
regarding its specific application to defendants. This piece has examined cases decided
in the semicentennial year following ICRA’s enactment, and told just a few of the
stories of the accused and the courts’ resolution of their claims. This Article suggests
that some of the doctrines involving ICRA have become needlessly complicated and
could be resolved better by returning to basic principles.
Banishment: Courts have spent too much energy trying to parse out factual dif-
ferences in cases concerning whether banishment is a sufficient constraint on liberty
to trigger ICRA’s habeas remedy. Courts should instead view banishment for what
it really is—the confinement of the excluded individual in a cell. Admittedly that
cell is nearly all-encompassing, but habeas has never required that a prison cell be
of any limited size to trigger the appropriateness of the habeas remedy. Tribal courts
should not be encouraged to pursue banishment instead of imprisonment in order to
avoid federal plenary review.
Right to a Jury: ICRA extends to each criminal defendant in a tribal proceeding
the right to a jury trial if requested. Defendants in tribal proceedings must be informed
of that right before the court accepts any plea, so that the accused can make a con-
scious decision about whether to invoke her right to a jury. Moreover, tribes must
of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B).”), id. at 747, with the dissent’s contrary conclusion (“The ordinary
meaning of ‘counsel’ in the legal context conveyed by the phrase ‘represented by counsel’
is a lawyer.”), id. at 749 (Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277 Id. at 747 (majority opinion).
278 Id. at 749 (Colloton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279 Id. at 743 (majority opinion) (noting that the defendant was also convicted of simple
assault and assault with a deadly weapon).
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develop their tribal codes and their courthouses to accommodate juries of at least six
individuals as required by ICRA. Failure to have a robust and impartial process in
place to empanel a jury is a denial of ICRA’s right to request a jury trial.
Effect of a Judgment: State and federal courts understandably struggle to articulate
a consistent rule for when a tribal-court conviction can serve as a predicate offense.
The situation is further complicated because the rights the Constitution affords to
defendants in a state or federal forum are different from the minimal procedures that
tribal courts are required to follow. Given this ambiguity, state and federal courts
should turn to the doctrine of lenity and hold that, when there is a question of whether
a tribal-court conviction should serve as a predicate offense, all ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of the accused. Treating tribal-court convictions in this way gives
respect to the unambiguous decisions of the tribal court, ensures that states generally
can enforce their criminal laws, and protects the rights of the Indian defendant.
Felix Cohen’s “canary in a coal mine” analogy is particularly apt when applied
to ICRA. By protecting the rights of Indian defendants in tribal courts, ICRA helps
ensure the rise of our democratic faith.
